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Municipal Regulation of Business in Ohio
What then will bring a renaissance of the Valentine Act? Perhaps
only determined attempts to utilize it will answer this question. Cer-
tainly, however, its use would be encouraged by providing the Ohio At-
torney General with a special staff and funds to apply to its enforce-
ment. The legislature might be of aid by rationalizing the penalties in
the act, indeed by rationalizing all the state's statutes regulating trade
practices. That this will come about at present, however, is unlikely.
The future of the Valentine Act may depend immediately upon the atti-
tude taken toward it by legal practitioners and the amount of imagina-
tion and care which they impart to utilization of its provisions.1 '
RITCHiE T. THOMAS
Municipal Regulation of Business in Ohio*
POWER TO RCEGULATE
The power to regulate business is derived from police power.' It
has been said that the police power "subsists in the state as an attribute
of sovereignty without any constitutional provisions conferring it."' The
Ohio Supreme Court has defined police power as
that inherent sovereignty which is the right and duty of the government
or its agents to exercise whenever public policy in a broad sense de-
mands, for the benefit of society at large, regulations to guard its
morals, safety, health, order or to insure in any respect such economic
conditions as an advancing civilization of a highly complex character
requires.3
Municipal Police Power
Municipalities are not sovereign and, therefore, can exercise only that
power which the state expressly grants to them.' Article XVIII, section
3 of the Ohio Constitution, adopted in 1912, provides:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-
government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local
police, sanitary, and other similar regulations as are not in conflict with
general laws.
114. The common order of events, however, has been that of increasing interest in private
suits following, not preceding, increased activity in bringing antitrust proceedings by law en-
forcement officials. Moreover, it is not to be expected that people will file complaints with
state authorities who have indicated so little interest in acting on them. "The volume of com-
plaints in all probability will be in fairly direct proportion to the amount of enforcement activ-
ity which is visible to the public eye." Rahl, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39
TLxAs I. REv. 753, 767 (1961). The Attorney General of the State of Texas once stated:
"I have never worked with a law so sensitive to enforcement policy." Wilson, The State Anti-
trust Laws, 47 A.B.A.J. 160, 162 (1961).
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This Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution is self-executing.'
Prior to 1912, municipalities had only such limited powers as the legisla-
ture saw fit to give them.6 Thereafter, they could freely utilize police
power to regulate business, among other things.
Conflicts Between Municipal Ordinances and State Statutes
Generally, in matters exclusively local in nature, the authority of a
municipality may not be challenged by the state; and if a state law con-
flicts with a municipal ordinance in this area, the state law is invalid.7
However, when the municipality exercises "police, sanitary and other
similar regulations,"' the ordinances must not conflict with state laws on
the particular subject.9 In determining whether an ordinance is in con-
flict with a general law of the state, the Ohio Supreme Court in Village
of Struthers v. Sokol'" held the test to be "whether the ordinance permits
or licenses that which the statute forbids and .. .vice versa.""
Licensing Business
Many sections of the Ohio Revised Code provide for municipal regu-
lation of particular businesses. Obviously, these provisions are unneces-
sary because the right of municipalities to regulate business is inherent
in their Home Rule powers.' 2 Moreover, these state regulations by no
means preclude municipalities from licensing other businesses. 13  A 1938
court of appeals decision, however, erroneously held that the licensing
power of a municipality was limited by a state statute.'4 The statute had
* The list of ordinances set out and discussed below is not exhaustive. There appears to be
no single source listing such ordinances in Ohio. While the areas of zoning, liquor control,
and taxation are within the general scope of municipal regulation of business, they will not
be treated in this article since each of the three is an exhaustive topic in itself.
1. State ex rel. Zugravu v. O'Brien, 130 Ohio St. 23, 26, 196 N.E. 664, 665 (1935).
2. Miami County v. City of Dayton, 92 Ohio St. 215, 223-24, 110 N.E. 726, 729 (1915);
accord, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
3. Frecker v. City of Dayton, 153 Ohio St. 14, 90 N.E.2d 851 (1950).
4. Cleveland Tel. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 121 N.E. 701 (1918).
5. City of Youngstown v. Arnold, 15 Ohio App. 112, 116 (1921).
6. Townsend v. City of Circleville, 78 Ohio St. 122, 84 N.E. 792 (1908).
7. State ex rel. Bindas v. Andrish, 165 Ohio St. 441, 136 N.E.2d 43 (1956). See generally
Blume, Municipal Home Rule in Ohio: The New Look, 11 W. RES. L. REV. 538 (1960).
8. OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
9. Greenburg v. City of Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 282, 120 N.E. 829 (1918).
10. 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
11. Id. at 263, 140 N.E. at 519-20.
12. 3 FARRELL-ELLIS, OHIO MUNICIPAL CODE § 9.16 (lth ed. 1962).
13. Columbus Legal Amusement Ass'n v. City of Columbus, 79 N.E.2d 915 (Ohio Ct. App.
1947).
14. Village of No. College Hill v. Woebkenberg, 59 Ohio App. 458, 18 N.E.2d 614 (1938).
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prohibited municipal corporations from requiring a vending or selling
license from one who manufactured or raised a product. 5
Regulation v. Prohibition
In Frecker v. City of Dayton,'" the court of appeals held that Article
XVIII, section 3 of the Ohio Constitution includes the power to regu-
late but not the power to prohibit. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed
the result 7 but disapproved of this conclusion. In 1957, the Ohio Su-
preme Court left no doubt that municipalities have the power to prohibit.
In Benjamin v. City of Columbus,'8 the court distinguished Frecker and
held:
A municipal ordinance enacted pursuant to the police power of the
municipality cannot be considered invalid merely because it prohibits
instead of regulates.' 9
Limitations of Municipal Police Power
Reasonableness
Even if regulation of a particular business is justified by public neces-
sity, it is invalid if it does not reasonably accomplish the intended public
purpose2 The selection of reasonable means is best left to the legisla-
tive branch. 1 It is readily apparent, however, that such an unchecked
power as this is subject to much abuse unless the courts exercise great
self-restraint. Therefore, the courts will apply the traditional test of rea-
sonableness, i.e., whether the means selected justify the end sought to be
accomplished1Y
It is unreasonable for a municipality to regulate for aesthetic pur-
poses.' Economic regulation, however, is permitted 4  But, in applying
these principles, it may prove difficult to separate a purely aesthetic pur-
pose from an economic purpose of preserving property values.
Municipal police power also is subject to the test of reasonableness of
classification. Hence, a City of Youngstown ordinance which taxed the
income of persons and corporations at different rates was held unconsl-
15. Onto REV. CODE § 715.63.
16. 88 Ohio App. 52, 85 N..2d 419 (1949).
17. Frecker v. City of Dayton, 153 Ohio St. 14, 90 N.E.2c1 851 (1950).
18. 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957).
19. Ibid.
20. Davis v. State, 118 Ohio St. 25, 160 N.E. 473 (1928).
21. Benjamin v. City of Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 NXE.2d 854 (1957).
22. City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 49 N.B.2d 412 (1943).
23. Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 NE. 30 (1925).
24. Holsman v. Thomas, 112 Ohio St. 397, 147 N.E. 750 (1925).
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tutional.25 The court of appeals found that the absence in the ordinance
of a reasonable basis for the apparent discrimination between corpora-
tions and individuals violated the equal protection clauses of the Ohio and
United States Constitutions.26
Constitutional Guarantees
Municipal corporations must not violate the due process, equal pro-
tection, or privileges and immunities clauses of the federal and state Con-
stitutions.2" Therefore, rules adopted pursuant to a local ordinance re-
quiring pawnbrokers to deliver to the police articles allegedly stolen and
subsequently pawned were held to be in contravention of the due process
clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. In this case, the
court also held invalid a section of the rules which gave the presiding
judge at the criminal trial of the accused thief the authority to determine
the rightful owner of the property.29 The court said, "The fact that a
pawnbroker is subject to strict regulations in the conduct of his business
does not mean that he may be denied his rights in property without due
process of law."3
REGULATION OF BUSINESS
Administration
License Cost Related to Fee
It is well established that the amount of a license fee must be reason-
ably based upon the cost of the municipal regulation."' If the license fee
is greatly excessive, it becomes a tax, and its validity will be judged on
that basis. It is clear, however, that both the state and the municipality
may impose license fees on the same business.32
Delegation of Authority
A municipal council may delegate rule making power to an admin-
istrative board or officer provided that the city council has established
the policy and standards for guidance of the agency or officer.33 Hence,
25. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. City of Youngstown, 91 Ohio App. 431, 108 N.E.2d
571 (1951).
26. Ibid.
27. 5 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 19.24 (3d ed. 1949).
28. Wacksman v. Harrell, 174 Ohio St. 338, 189 N.E.2d 146 (1963).
29. Id. at 342, 189 N.E.2d at 149.
30. Id. at 340, 189 N.E.2d at 148.
31. Stary v. City of Brooklyn, 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.E.2d 11 (1954).
32. Ibid.
33. Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329, 55 N.E.2d 629 (1944).
[Vol. 15:195
Manicipal Regulation of Business in Ohio
a municipal ordinance authorizing the city treasurer of Cincinnati to grant
professional bondsmen permits to "responsible persons" was proper be-
cause "responsible persons" was held to be an ascertainable standard. 4
A City of Dayton ordinance delegated authority to an agency to
limit the solicitation of funds by charitable organizations. Upon denial
of a license to such an organization, the Ohio Supreme Court held the
ordinance to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power be-
cause it failed to establish any standards for the agency. "
The revocation of a license because of a violation of the terms of a
regulatory ordinance is an executive rather than a judicial function.36
Licensing Particular Businesses
Trailer Parks
A municipal ordinance which limited the parking of house trailers in
a trailer park to a period not to exceed three months in any one year was
upheld in Stary v. City of Brooklyn"7 as a valid exercise of police power.
The Ohio Supreme Court took notice of the advance in the art of trailer
construction and the increase in the use of house trailers, but said that
these factors increased the problems of the municipality in protecting the
health, safety, welfare, and morals of the community."8 However, as
pointed out in the dissenting opinion, it is difficult to see any reasonable
relation between an ordinance limiting the tenure of trailers in a trailer
park and the protection of the public health, safety, welfare, or morals.3 9
Going-Out-of-Business Sales
The court of appeals in Foltzer v. City of Cincinnati"0 upheld an ordi-
nance which provided for licensing going-out-of-business sales. The
court found that the purpose of protection of the public from financial
loss sufficiently related the ordinance to the police power. Furthermore,
since the plaintiff made no attempt to comply with the law, the court
34. State ex rel. Howell v. Schiele, 85 Ohio App. 356, 88 N.E.2d 215 (1949). Moreover,
where a permit was required to hold a public dance and the administrative officer refused to
issue a permit to anyone, mandamus would not lie as this was a valid exercise of discretion.
Rowland v. State, 104 Ohio St 366, 135 N.E. 622 (1922).
35. American Cancer Socy, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 160 Ohio St. 114, 114 N.E.2d 219
(1953). The grounds for denying the license were: (1) the objective of the organization was
already covered by another license; (2) it would be without benefit to the community; (3)
it would be an undue burden to the people of the community; and (4) it would hinder and
interfere with the activity of an organization to which a permit already had been granted.
36. Klein v. City of Cincinnati, 33 Ohio App. 137, 168 N.E. 549 (1929).
37. Stary v. City of Brooklyn, 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.E.2d 11 (1954). Contra, Richards
v. City of Pontiac, 305 Mich. 666, 9 N.W.2d 885 (1943).
38. Stary v. City of Brooklyn, supra note 37.
39. Id. at 143, 121 N.E.2d at 23 (dissenting opinion).
40. 100 Ohio App. 546, 137 N.B.2d 523 (1956).
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merely held that the ordinance was not unreasonable per se.4 The
court had no occasion to consider whether operation of the ordinance
was unreasonable in its application to this particular plaintiff.
Jewelry Auctions
A City of Cleveland ordinance provided, among other things, that:
(1) no jewelry shall be sold at auction for a period greater than sixty
days in one year; (2) the auctioneer must have been a resident of the
city for one year; and (3) the auctioneer must have had a regular stock
of jewelry for six months of that year. The Ohio Supreme Court, in
1925, upheld the validity of the ordinance on the grounds that it was
a warranted protection of the public's financial safety and thus came
within the municipal police power."
Food and Drugs
Ordinances requiring an inspection of all meat sold or offered for sale
in a municipality"3 and ordinances requiring that meat bear an official
inspection stamp44 are valid exercises of the police power to protect the
public health. Municipalities may also require a license to operate a
delicatessen45 and can regulate sales of corn sugar.46
Public Vehicles
A Cincinnati ordinance provided that unlicensed out-of-city public ve-
hicles (taxicabs) could discharge passengers within the city limits, but
could neither accept nor offer to accept passengers, nor conduct any busi-
ness within the city limits. Defendant operated a taxicab company in
Village M and was unlicensed in Cincinnati; but defendant did maintain
a telephone within the city limits where business calls were received and
forwarded to the taxicab stand in Village M. The court held the ordi-
nance valid, but stated that the maintenance of a telephone in the city was
merely incidental to conduct of the taxicab business in Village M and did
not remove the place of business from Village M.47
Another Cincinnati ordinance provided for the arrest of any person
operating a taxicab without a license, and upon his conviction, for the
public sale of the vehicle. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the statute
violated the due process clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitu-
41. Id. at 548, 137 N.E.2d at 524.
42. Holsman v. Thomas, 112 Ohio St. 397, 147 N.E. 750 (1925).
43. City of Dayton v. Jacobs, 120 Ohio St. 225, 165 N.E. 844 (1929).
44. City of Cleveland v. Terrill, 149 Ohio St. 532, 80 N.E.2d 115 (1948).
45. Levitt v. City of Cleveland, 40 Ohio App. 405, 178 N.E. 593 (1931).
46. Grown v. City of Cleveland, 125 Ohio St. 455, 181 N.E. 897 (1932).
47. Mariemont Taxi, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 162 Ohio St. 163, 122 N.E.2d 400 (1954).
[Vol. 15:195
Municipal Regulation of Business in Ohio
tions because there was no opportunity for the owner of the vehicle to
be heard.48
Weights and Measures
Historically, municipalities have had the power to enforce standards
of weights and measures.4" An ordinance fixing standard sizes of bread
loaves and prescribing a minimum weight of one pound per loaf is
neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.5"
Plumbing
Municipalities may regulate the plumbing business by requiring per-
sons to secure plumbing licenses or permits.1 The Ohio Supreme Court,
however, struck down a City of Dayton ordinance which required all pur-
chasers of plumbing fixtures to give their names, addresses, and the place
of the proposed installation of the fixtures. In addition, all sellers of
plumbing fixtures were to make weekly reports of all sales, setting forth
all the information required of purchasers, and were required to affix
stickers obtained from the city plumbing inspector on all fixtures sold.'
The court applied the traditional test of reasonableness, holding that the
burdens placed upon the individuals outweighed the benefits to the pub-
lic."8 Absent the exhaustive record keeping requirements, the above
ordinance probably would have been upheld.
Nonlicensing Regulation
Hours of Business
In 1916, the Ohio Supreme Court sustained a City of Cleveland ordi-
nance which provided that, except in emergencies, workmen engaged in
any public work carried on or aided by the City of Cleveland could not
work more than eight hours per day or more than forty-eight hours per
week. 4
The Ohio Supreme Court, in the 1935 case of Wilson v. City of
Zanesville,55 construed artide II, section 34 of the Ohio Constitution,
which authorizes laws fixing the hours of labor, as a grant of power to
the Ohio Legislature which could be subdelegated to municipal corpora-
48. Lindsay v. City of Cincinnati, 172 Ohio St. 137, 174 N.E.2d 96 (1961).
49. Huddleson v. Ruffin, 6 Ohio St. 604 (1856).
50. Allion v. City of Toledo, 99 Ohio St. 416, 124 NYE. 237 (1919).
51. Vincent v. City of Cincinnati, 17 Ohio App. 219 (1922).
52. Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. City of Dayton, 138 Ohio St. 540, 38 N.E.2d 70 (1941).
53. Ibid.
54. Stange v. City of Cleveland, 94 Ohio St. 377, 114 N.E. 261 (1916).
55. 130 Ohio St. 286, 199 NE. 187 (1935).
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tions.56 Therefore, the City of Zanesville could regulate the hours of
business of barbershops.
A year later, however, the court held that an ordinance fixing the
hours during which grocery stores would be open for business violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution and article I, section 16 of the Ohio Constitution."
In 1943, by a four to three decision, the Ohio Supreme Court directly
overruled Wilson v. City of Zanesville, holding that an ordinance regu-
lating the business hours of a barbershop is arbitrary and unreasonable,
as it has no substantial relation to the protection of public health, wel-
fare, safety, or morals.5"
Finally, in 1960, the court distinguished the Wilson case and upheld
and enforced an ordinance which required junkyards in residential dis-
tricts to be closed between the hours of 6:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M. on
weekdays and all day on Sunday. 9 Although the court of appeals had
held this part of the ordinance unconstitutional, the supreme court held:
[W]here a noisy operation such as a junkyard is conducted in a resi-
dential neighborhood, it is certainly reasonable to require its cessation
for substantial periods. The requirement of such cessation certainly
would bear a substantial relationship to the health of those in the
neighborhood and hence to the public health and welfare.60
In conclusion, an ordinance regulating the hours of business alone
probably would be invalid. But, if the business is a nuisance, the city
probably will be given greater discretion.
Trucking
Ohio municipalities may reasonably control the weight of vehicles
using their streets which are not state highways. " In fact, the municipal-
ity is supreme in this area since its ordinance will prevail when the
ordinance conflicts with state statutes permitting heavier trucks to use the
same streets.62  A municipality also may force truckers to use only state
highways when passing through the city.63 However, an ordinance re-
56. Ibid.
57. Olds v. Klotz, 131 Ohio St. 447, 3 N.E.2d 371 (1936).
58. City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 49 N.E.2d 412 (1943).
59. City of Akron v. Klein, 171 Ohio St. 207, 168 N.E.2d 564 (1960).
60. Id. at 214, 168 N.E.2d at 569.
61. Perkins v. Village of Quaker City, 165 Ohio St. 120, 133 N.E.2d 595 (1956). How-
ever, an ordinance which prohibits the operation of heavy trucks on all streets of a municipal-
ity, except for loading and unloading, is discriminatory against non-residents of the municipal-
ity. As such it is an unreasonable classification in violation of the equal protection clauses of
the Ohio and United States Constitutions. Richter Concrete Corp. v. City of Reading, 166
Ohio St. 279, 142 N.E.2d 525 (1957).
62. Union Sand & Supply Corp. v. Village of Fairport, 172 Ohio St. 387, 176 N.E.2d 224
(1961); Froelich v. City of Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919).
63. Perkins v. Village of Quaker City, 165 Ohio St. 120, 133 N.E.2d 595 (1956).
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quiring heavy trucks to follow a named street, stay in the extreme right
lane, and not pass at any time was invalidated as arbitrary and unreason-
able.
4
The power to regulate trucking by controlling access to certain streets
by certain vehicles is quite limited. An ordinance prohibiting the opera-
tion of heavy trucks at night on streets which are the sole access to the
trucker's premises is unconstitutional because it is arbitrary and unrea-
sonable. "5 An ordinance barring all trucks from a limited access freeway
is void when the sole justification for the ordinance is the fact that the
freeway is congested for one and a half hours a day.6"
The Ohio Supreme Court, however, upheld a City of Cleveland ordi-
nance regulating the length of trucks using that city's streets.67 The ordi-
nance prohibited the operation of tractor-trailers exceeding forty-five feet
in length on city streets.
Prohibition of Business
Door-to-Door Solicitors
A municipal ordinance which prohibited uninvited house-to-house
soliciting was sustained by the United States Supreme Court in Beard v.
City of Alexandria.6" The Court held that the ordinance in question did
not violate the freedom of speech or press of the solicitor. Moreover, in
balancing the conveniences, the Court gave greater weight to the home-
owner's right to privacy than to the business' right to distribute its
product.
Although the Ohio Supreme Court never has ruled on this precise
question, there have been several related cases. In City of Struthers v.
Martin,9 the court indirectly upheld an ordinance which prohibited door-
to-door salesmen by dismissing the appeal from a conviction thereunder.7"
An ordinance of the City of Defiance prohibited the "practice" of go-
ing in and upon private residences to solicit orders for the sale of goods.
Without ruling on the constitutionality of the ordinance, the court of
appeals held that the "practice" requirement had not been established by
a single act of solicitation.71
64. City of Bellevue v. Hopps, 164 Ohio St. 523, 132 NXE.2d 204 (1956).
65. City of Cleveland v. Antonio, 100 Ohio App. 334, 124 N.E.2d 846 (1955). Where
"no stopping or parking" signs are posted in front of a public hotel without any exception
in favor of guests of the hotel the signs are an unreasonable infringement on the owner's
right to conduct a lawful business. Therefore, the erection of such signs will be enjoined.
Raskin Hotel Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 97 Ohio App. 424, 126 N.E.2d 922 (1954).
66. Janoviak v. Cregan, 162 NXE.2d 561 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
67. City of Cleveland v. Curluter, 163 Ohio St. 269, 126 N.E.2d 436 (1955).
68. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
69. 139 Ohio St. 372, 40 NXE.2d 154 (1942).
70. Ibid.
71. City of Defiance v. Nagel, 108 Ohio App. 119, 159 N.E.2d 791 (1959).
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A common pleas court declared invalid as an unreasonable exercise
of police power an ordinance which prohibited street sales of any mer-
chandise to any person under eighteen years of age.72 Here the court said
that a less comprehensive prohibition as to sales on certain thoroughfares
or the regulation of sales as to hours or location would be valid.7"
Advertising
As in door-to-door solicitations, a municipality may prohibit the dis-
tribution of handbills and other house-to-house advertising." But an
ordinance which prohibited the distribution of only those circulars which
advertised goods for sale was discriminatory and unconstitutional."
A court of appeals held that the City of Cleveland could legally
prohibit the distribution of samples of foodstuffs and drugs to pedestrians
upon streets in congested districts.7" Here, there was a direct relation of
the ordinance to the public health. But in the same opinion, the court
struck down a section of the ordinance which prohibited the distribution
of handbills and circulars upon the same streets as merely incidental to
the conduct of a lawful business.77
That a municipality may prohibit false, misleading, or deceptive ad-
vertising is beyond question. However, an attempt to accomplish this
objective by providing that no gasoline station may place signs advertis-
ing the price of gas anywhere but upon the pumps is wholly unreason-
able.78
An ordinance prohibiting fraudulent or deceptive advertising in the
sale of eyeglasses and eyeglass frames is valid even though such advertis-
ing also is regulated by state statutes.7"
Illegal Occupations and Businesses
There is no inherent right to conduct a business which, by its nature,
is so potentially dangerous to the public that it is subject to strict police
regulation." Therefore, a municipality may prohibit the possession,81
exhibition, or operation82 of slot machines within the municipality after
72. Frost Bar Inc. v. City of Shaker Heights, 141 N.E.2d 245 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
73. Id. at 247 (dictum).
74. Lewis v. Washington, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 396 (Cr. App. 1938).
75. Cleveland Shopping News Co. v. City of Lorain, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 265 (Ct. App. 1932).
76. In re Thornburg, 55 Ohio App. 229, 9 N.E.2d 516 (1936).
77. Ibid.
78. Moreson v. City of Akron, 20 Ohio Op. 298 (C.P. 1941).
79. City of Springfield v. Hurst, 144 Ohio St. 49, 56 N.E.2d 185 (1944).
80. 5 McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 19.24 (3d ed. 1949).
81. Benjamin v. City of Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957).
82. Myers v. City of Cincinnati, 128 Ohio St. 235, 190 N.E. 569 (1934).
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a determination that they are detrimental to the public morals and
welfare.8"
Upon establishing a proper constitutional standard, a municipality
also may prohibit the possession of obscene literature for sale or dissemi-
nation."
Nuisances per se
Attempts by municipalities to prohibit certain businesses because they
are nuisances have met with little success in Ohio courts. An ordinance
of the Village of Cuyahoga Heights prohibiting the operation of coal
yards within a certain distance of food factories without regard to their
manner of operation was an unconstitutional deprivation of property
without due process of law. 5 Here the court held that a coal yard was
not a nuisance per se.
The City of Defiance declared by ordinance that a junkyard was a
nuisance and prohibited its operation unless a fence was constructed so
that the junk stored on the premises would not be visible. The court of
appeals held this to be an unconstitutional exercise of police power, since
the ordinance was based solely on aesthetic considerations."8
The Village of Antwerp enacted an ordinance which prohibited the
storage of inflammable liquids within a certain distance of any school,
religious, amusement, or other building used as a place of assembly. The
court of appeals held this to be an unreasonable and arbitrary ordinance,
especially in light of the relative safety in which gasoline is now stored."7
ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE AND ACTIVITY
It is believed that a brief survey of the procedures and activity in the
area of law enforcement may provide a perspective different and per-
haps more revealing than the case law.88 There is a great variance be-
tween court pronounced case law and the realities of local law enforce-
ment It is surprising to note that many cities still are regulating busi-
ness areas which the Ohio Supreme Court has declared beyond the realm
of municipal jurisdiction, e.g., hours of businesss.89 Other cities employ
enforcement procedures which amount to little more than intimidation of
83. Ibid.
84. City of Cincinnati v. King, 107 Ohio App. 453, 159 N.E.2d 767 (1958). But cf. text
at ENFORMc'NT PROcEDURE AND AcTIVrry, infra note 88.
85. Wolarz v. Village of Cuyahoga Heights, 53 Ohio App. 161, 4 N.E.2d 400 (1936).
86. City of Defiance v. Kilion, 116 Ohio App. 60, 186 N.E.2d 634 (1962).
87. State ex rel. Cadwallader v. Village of Antwerp, 104 Ohio App. 109, 146 N.E.2d 877
(1957).
88. The author gratefully acknowledges the co-operation of the law departments of the fol-
lowing Ohio cities: Cincinnati, Euclid, Lima, and Springfield.
89. City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 49 N.E.2d 412 (1943).
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local businessmen, e.g., publishing in the local newspaper the names of
book dealers who, in the eyes of the city law department, are selling ob-
scene publications. This eliminates the "burden" of a public trial. As
one assistant law director said:
We do not attempt to regulate the sale of obscene publications by
means of ordinances. Rather, the legal department has worked out a
voluntary program with our magazine and book distributors whereby
various publications are submitted to our department for study. Based
upon our approval or rejection, the distributor either does or does not
offer these publications for sale. Certain magazines are considered by
a committee of citizens which makes like recommendations that are
followed by the distributor. This procedure in effect gives us greater
control than an ordinance ever could.
In light of such procedures, it is not surprising that most law depart-
ments encounter "fine cooperation" from local businessmen.
Apparently most municipal law departments prefer to enforce busi-
ness ordinances on a complaint-by-complaint basis. In fact, most law de-
partments express reluctance to do anything in the area of business regu-
lation unless prodded by competitors of the violator or complaining cus-
tomers. Other municipalities have a "town-meeting" procedure whereby
residents air their complaints to the City Council, including those relat-
ing to business. These complaints then presumably are acted upon by
the law department and police force. Some municipalities admit that the
enforcement of business regulations is done solely by the police.
From the above procedures, it is readily seen that enforcement of
business regulations is dependent upon a complaint to the local authori-
ties. It likewise is apparent that the ordinances are enacted on a prob-
lem-by-problem basis as they arise. Hence, there has been no attempt to
enact a uniform municipal business code.
According to various law departments, local Chambers of Commerce
and Better Business Bureaus take no active part in the passage or enforce-
ment of business regulating ordinances.
CONCLUSION
Under the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution, Ohio
municipalities have broad power to regulate business. The Ohio courts,
however, require that the objective of an ordinance bear a substantial re-
lation to the public health, welfare, safety, or morals. Likewise, an ordi-
nance must pass the stringent test of reasonableness.
It is surprising, to say the least, that in the area of enforcement, local
law departments ride "rough shod" over the individual rights of local
businessmen. Municipal law enforcement is sporadic. On one hand, en-
forcement is dependent on a complaint against the alleged violator from
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a customer or a competitor. Other municipalities enforce ordinances
which are in violation of constitutional safeguards.
One might think that local Chambers of Commerce and Better Busi-
ness Bureaus would take active roles in the regulation of business by
municipalities. But the above groups have indicated no such interest to date.
Admittedly, municipal regulation is not uniform. Under such cir-
cumstances, some may advocate a return to state control in this area. It
is submitted, however, that this is an area where uniformity is neither
necessary nor even desirable. The underlying rationale of Home Rule
dictates that municipalities are best qualified to regulate businesses in
their own localities in light of each business's local peculiarities. Muni-
cipalities, however, should continually determine whether their current
laws are valid and whether their law enforcement procedures can be
improved.
JAMES A. LAURENSON
